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Egypt’s 2011 revolutionary upheaval led to the 
ousting of  President Mubarak and the ascent to 
power of  the Supreme Council of  Armed Forces 
(SCAF). Trying to contain an ever-growing wave of  
protest while sustaining a system based on central 
elitism and authoritarian guardianship, the SCAF 
soon partnered with the popular but conservative 
Muslim Brotherhood and the police—forming a 
new ruling troika. It was not long before the Broth-
erhood took the front seat in this troika, holding 
both the presidency and a plurality in parliament. 
Two years later, however, political and economic 
failures led to a rapid decline of  popularity, trig-
gering massive protests that eventually allowed the 
military to dispose of  the elected president and to 
announce a roadmap for transition.
The Muslim Brotherhood ignored the alarm 
signals in the weeks preceding the military inter-
vention on July 3, 2013. The group’s leadership 
also chose to maintain its organizational unity by 
claiming victimi zation, and hence neither offered 
the opposition any meaningful compromises nor 
stepped down from power peacefully. It held to 
this strategy in the aftermath of  President Morsi’s 
ousting, contributing to an unprecedented death 
toll and an ongoing cycle of  violence. The state 
has stepped up its crackdown and there has been 
a violent Islamist resurgence as well as numerous 
terrorist attacks. Since July 2013, more than 3,500 
Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers have been 
killed, and some 25,000 are still detained. A court 
verdict ordered the dissolution of  the Brotherhood 
in September, and the interim government pro-
nounced it a “terrorist organization” in November. 
While thousands of  Muslim Brotherhood support-
ers and others continue their protest, the emer-
gent regime has persistently followed a predefined 
track. A restrictive protest law was ratified last 
November, allowing for a massive wave of  arrests 
and suppression of  all forms of  protest. In addi-
tion, widespread defamation campaigns targeting 
the Brotherhood were orchestrated, constitutional 
amendments were ratified with a 98 percent major-
ity in a referendum last January, presidential elec-
tions devoid of  either genuine competition or equal 
opportunities took place last month, and parlia-
mentary elections are due within the next weeks.
New President, New Challenges
President El-Sisi’s sweeping electoral victory came 
as no surprise. But the low turnout and subsequent 
decision to extend the election for an additional 
day sent alarming signals as regards the regime’s 
popularity and long-term success. At least three 
factors contributed to the disappointing turnout—
each reflecting another aspect of  the emergent 
regime’s problems. The first is the decay of  the 
July 3 alliance. Initially including revolutionary and 
pro-democracy activists, these actors soon found 
no space in what is becoming an autocratic regime 
par excellence. Crackdowns on human rights and 
civil liberties, as well as the militarization of  both 
the state and of  public space under the pretext of  a 
“war on terrorism,” have left no room for opposi-
tion from within the system. Many have therefore 
chosen to break ties with the regime. Without via-
ble alternatives in the presidential elections, boycott 
was the only meaningful choice.
Beyond the Crisis
A Roadmap for Reconciliation in Egypt
by Ibrahim El Houdaiby
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Second, El-Sisi’s own performance during the cam-
paign also contributed to the low turnout. After 
months of  being portrayed as a savior who could 
pull Egypt out of  its economic, security, and politi-
cal woes, the presidential candidate finally spoke—
only to disappoint his supporters. His demand 
of  more patience from Egyptians without either 
presenting a roadmap for reform or promising any 
improvement in their everyday lives disenchanted a 
considerable segment of  his supporters. The third 
and most important factor is the fallout of  intra-
regime conflicts within a failing system. While com-
batting the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist 
allies helped unify the emergent regime, economic 
interests have been rather divisive. Reports on El-
Sisi’s campaign meetings with business tycoons 
revealed a profound conflict between the need for 
socioeconomic changes to sustain the system on 
the one hand and a business class fiercely battling 
for crony privileges on the other. Capitalizing on 
large-scale clientele networks and an influential 
media establishment, corrupt businessmen appear 
to have fought their battle by demobilizing voters, 
distorting the new president’s image of  invincibility. 
Their message was straightforward: you owe your 
success to our networks, so maintain our interests.
This is not to suggest that El-Sisi’s power base 
has been seriously diminished. He will still walk 
into the presidential palace with unprecedented 
power. While his image of  invincibility is probably 
gone for good, he retains three powerful assets: 
a strong popular mandate, sufficient understand-
ing of  the challenges of  the complicated Egyptian 
state—accumulated through a long history within 
its ranks—and the support and backing of  the 
country’s strongest institution, the armed forces. 
Nonetheless, his presidency will encounter grave 
structural and political challenges. A malfunction-
ing bureaucracy and increasingly dysfunctional state 
institutions will impede efforts to provide public 
services at acceptable levels. Deteriorating eco-
nomic conditions, including income disparity and 
mounting levels of  poverty and unemployment, 
will continue to destabilize the system—against 
the background of  ever-growing social protests. 
The threat of  terrorism also destabilizes the sys-
tem, paralyzing the vital tourist sector and draining 
the state’s already scarce resources. The persistent 
political crisis increasingly contributes to the sys-
tem’s fragility, scaring away investors. Moreover, the 
narrowing of  the political space, together with eco-
nomic hardship, further hinders efforts to integrate 
young people—mobilized during the revolutionary 
upheaval—and contributes to their radicalization, 
both religious and political. Collectively, these 
pressing challenges put the long-term success of  
the emergent regime at stake.
An Organizational Paradox
The Muslim Brotherhood is also facing great 
challenges. Both leaders and members argue that 
last summer’s coup was inevitable, as it had been 
plott ed by the “deep state” (the hidden interests 
dominating Egypt’s gigantic public sector) ever 
since President Morsi’s ascent to power. In this 
view, the coup was facilitated by engineered failures 
(including economic failures, electricity cuts, and 
energy shortages) that provoked large-scale dis-
sent and provided cover for the military step-in. 
The Muslim Brotherhood therefore hopes that 
paralyzing the economy and exhausting the emer-
gent regime by prolonging the conflict will lead to 
government failure—hence restoring the Brother-
hood’s power, or at least putting it in a better posi-
tion to negotiate.
While it is true that the persistence of  economic 
challenges will uproot the pillars of  regime stabil-
ity, the political comeback of  the Muslim Brother-
hood is unlikely anytime soon. Since the events of  
last summer at the latest, a media campaign has 
tarnished the group’s reputation by tying it to vio-
lent groups, accusing it of  attempting to enforce 
a strict model of  sharia, highlighting cases of  cor-
ruption and misconduct, and positing the Brother-
hood’s transnational networks as a threat to Egypt’s 
national security. Further, the ongoing crack-
down—while helping the organization maintain its 
unity—undermines its organizational and political 
power. In fact, once again, the regime is using the 
Muslim Brotherhood as a bogeyman—representing 
the Brotherhood as the only alternative has been 
the single most important factor deferring protest 
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and keeping the disparate actors within the regime 
united. However, while a weakening of  the emer-
gent regime might allow more space for the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the group might not necessarily be 
able to exploit it. The Brotherhood is challenged 
by both growing radical tendencies within its ranks 
and the emergence of  other Islamist alternatives.
Nevertheless, Brotherhood involvement in violent 
activities is still highly unlikely. The group’s com-
mitment to non-violent engagement is one of  the 
few foundations holding it together. For historical, 
organizational, and practical reasons, the prob-
ability of  the group discarding this principle is very 
low. But the bloody summer of  2013, when some 
jihadist groups protested together with the Mus-
lim Brotherhood, has produced growing radical 
tendencies. While radical voices were marginal in 
terms of  numbers and influence during the sit-ins, 
since that time excessive use of  violence against 
protestors alongside harsh court verdicts and a 
media campaign dehumanizing the Brotherhood 
have all contri buted to mainstreaming radicalism. 
This radicalization poses two serious organiza-
tional challenges. First, it undermines the leader-
ship’s ability to compromise. Second, its grip on 
the organization has loosened since the massacres. 
This lack of  a strong leadership and members tak-
ing the organization into their own hands could 
put organizational unity at risk in any move toward 
reconciliation.
Second, one needs to consider the medium- and 
long-term impact of  radicalization on organiza-
tional unity, even if  leadership makes no move 
towards reconciliation. The radicalization of  young 
people, students and peasants has become a real-
ity. Recent events and pressure from the grass-
roots have forced the Brotherhood’s leadership 
to redefine non-violence to include “all defensive 
measures that do not involve the use of  bullets.” 
The underpinning argument is that violence is still 
condemnable, but legitimate self-defense is not vio-
lence. The leadership hopes to thus reduce young 
people’s incentive to listen to jihadists. But if  the 
cycle of  violence continues, the state will increas-
ingly repress Brotherhood members, making any 
compromise on the part of  the group’s leadership 
inacceptable for its more radical camp. The Broth-
erhood would then be split between radicals openly 
advocating violence on one side, and a conserva-
tive leadership and traditional constituency on the 
other. The organization therefore needs to walk 
down a reconciliatory path to cure the causes of  
divisive radicalization while at the same time—
paradoxically—abstaining from concessions in 
order to maintain unity. Contextual changes could 
therefore catalyze a shift in orientation and facilitate 
reconciliation.
The emergence of  Islamist alternatives is another 
major challenge facing the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Islamism has already moved from the core to the 
periphery of  Egyptian politics, and a growing 
number of  actors are competing over diminishing 
space. The regime-allied Salafi Nour Party hopes 
to capitalize on the Muslim Brotherhood’s exclu-
sion and to take its place as the hegemonic Islamist 
actor, but persistent Islamist-secular polarization 
hinders these efforts. Although politicized Salafis 
are more inclined to join the Brotherhood and its 
Islamist partners due to the persistent polarization, 
the Nour Party is nevertheless a major domestic 
rival for the Muslim Brotherhood. As a reconcilia-
tion process would soften polarization, the Broth-
erhood would have to compete with Nour for the 
Islamist constituency. Aware of  this upcoming 
battle, the organization’s leadership is currently 
focused on discrediting Nour’s political positions, 
labelling them sellouts and traitors.
Toward Reconciliation
Political reconciliation is only one—albeit crucial and 
problematic—component of  Egypt’s roadmap out 
of  its current crisis. Structural deficits in both the 
state and the economy pose more serious challenges 
to stability than the current conflict. Nevertheless, 
reconciliation remains a prerequisite for approaching 
these challenges and the conflicting parties are pay-
ing a heavy price for its delay. It should therefore be 
dealt with as an integral component of  building a new, 
more democratic and equitable polity.
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The first step toward reconciliation should be to 
maintain a polity with minimal barriers to inclu-
sion. While advocates of  violence must not be 
tolerated, others (both Islamist and secular) should 
be allowed to organize themselves and participate 
actively in the political process. The state should 
not deal with the terrorist threat by closing political 
space (which only radicalizes dissent by pushing it 
underground), but through a sophisticated strategy 
that undermines Islamists’ isolationist tendencies. 
This also requires revisiting the centralist state 
structure. The empowerment of  diverse groups 
can help overcome the zero-sum game between 
“state identity” and “Islamist identity,” and empow-
ered local governments and municipalities could 
act as important platforms in this regard. Legisla-
tion enabling more public participation in decision 
making—particularly at the local level—should be 
pursued to broaden the system’s legitimacy and 
make democracy more meaningful within local 
communities.
Revisiting socioeconomic policies is an integral 
component of  both reconciliation and building a 
sustainable polity. Owing to deep structural defi-
cits, the new president will soon need to choose 
between stability and stagnation. While facing clear 
resistance from business tycoons and the status quo 
forces that dominate the bureaucracy, delaying such 
reforms will only complicate El-Sisi’s presidency. 
He has already reached the peak of  his popularity, 
and as time passes, he will be less able to capitalize 
on his strong popular mandate to challenge these 
networks. He should therefore swiftly revisit the 
state’s socioeconomic biases to allow for the inclu-
sion of  larger segments of  society, consequently 
decreasing the incentive for isolation. Other essen-
tial measures include serious efforts to decrease 
income gaps through the imposition of  maximum 
and minimum wages without exceptions, restruc-
turing subsidies and lifting those directed at energy-
intensive industries, and wider state responsibility 
for social services, most importantly healthcare and 
education.
Transitional justice is an integral component of  any 
meaningful reconciliation process. It should focus 
on the structural causes of  injustice on at least 
three different fronts; namely widespread human 
rights violations, structural deficits that have led to 
a political gridlock, and deficits that have led to the 
growth of  crony capitalism. This process should 
also deal with government crimes committed under 
the SCAF, Morsi’s presidency, and the post-Broth-
erhood interim regime. While the balance of  power 
does not necessarily allow for punishing criminals, 
investigation and fact-finding and equal access to 
amnesty for all parties through a truth and recon-
ciliation process could help cure some of  the woes 
caused by the cycle of  violence. Additionally, a 
multi-partisan anti-terrorist bill that upholds human 
rights should be coupled with training and capacity 
building for security personnel.
Another key step toward reconciliation is inclusion 
of  a new political leadership. President El-Sisi’s 
electoral victory has sent provoking signals regard-
ing the revitalization of  Mubarak’s regime, and 
reliance on Mubarak’s entourage and political aides 
will legitimize Islamists’ claim that the “coup” was 
planned to restore his regime. New political faces 
are less burdened with deep enmities and hostili-
ties and therefore more capable of  walking down 
a path of  inclusiveness and reconciliation. Instead 
of  relying primarily on officers, bureaucrats, and 
businessmen (as was the case during the previ-
ous decades), the new leadership should reflect 
societal diversity in terms of  religion, ethnicity, 
gender, class, and political views. Empowering local 
governments will help breed this new leadership 
in the medium and long term, while a short-term 
strategy should be based on minimizing reliance on 
Mubarak’s elite and giving more space to a vibrant 
civil society and to young people.
In order to regain its place in the polity, the Muslim 
Brotherhood should pursue a multi-dimensional 
strategy. A change in leadership is both necessary 
and overdue. The current leadership, with its politi-
cal failures and tarnished reputation, has become a 
heavy burden that poses an obstacle to inclusion in 
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society and in the political arena. Instead of  using 
the moment of  crisis as an excuse to postpone 
internal restructuring, it should be grasped as an 
opportunity to change the leadership if  it does not 
willingly retire.
However, it is key that the Muslim Brotherhood 
also acknowledge the legitimacy of  the emergent 
regime. In fact, the ratification of  constitutional 
amendments with overwhelming majority turns 
the page on Morsi’s regime, and provides the new 
regime with constitutional legitimacy, the only form 
of  legitimacy previously claimed by the Brother-
hood. Acknowledging the new regime’s constitu-
tional legitimacy would pave the way for a more 
credible criticism of  its political legitimacy. These 
claims are not unfounded, given recurrent police 
violations, laws restricting basic rights and free-
doms, and the authorities’ failure to observe the 
constitution on several occasions.
The upcoming parliamentary elections could be 
another milestone. In a recent statement, the Mus-
lim Brotherhood made clear that it has not yet 
decided whether or not to boycott the elections. 
While the decision to boycott threatens the Broth-
erhood as it gives Nour the upper hand in winning 
the Islamist constituency, announcing candidates 
will only increase polarization and impede reconcili-
ation. The Brotherhood would be well-advised to 
not present candidates, but to actively—through 
its local networks—support whoever it believes to 
be the best candidate for every seat. Decentralized 
decisions will help the group regain its legitimacy at 
the local level and take away its stigma as the Other. 
Further, decentralization would empower the 
group’s local constituency, boosting organizational 
democracy and allowing for the ascent of  new 
leaders. Rather than competing in the parliamentary 
elections, the Muslim Brotherhood should focus 
on developing a new, more competent generation 
of  politicians through participation in elections for 
local governments.
However, these reforms can only bear fruit if  the 
group undertakes one major organizational change: 
it needs to adjust its structure to the country’s con-
stitutional framework. A genuine separation of  the 
social organization and the political party is over-
due, and necessary to regain political legitimacy. 
In terms of  funding, activities, membership, and 
discourse, the Freedom and Justice Party should 
clearly distinguish itself  from the Muslim Brother-
hood. The social organization should register as a 
civil society organization to ensure a higher level 
of  transparency and accountability, especially if  it 
wishes to effectively counter charges of  capitalizing 
on foreign funds, money laundering, and corrup-
tion. In parallel, the group—alongside other civil 
society and political organizations—should press 
for changes in the restrictive NGO laws. Finding 
these common denominators with other political 
and societal forces can be part of  a lengthy, but 
much-needed path toward societal salvation.
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